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Rm:Bsu>E OEMENT 00. tI. PUBLIC UTlL. 00.. [35 O.2d
[L. A. No. 21085. In Bank. May 2, 1950.]

RIVERSIDE CEMENT COMPANY (a Corporation) et al.,
Petitioners, v. THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, etc., et al., Respondents.
[1] Public Utilities-RegUlation-Rates or Charges-Reparation.

-Where a special eontract between a cement company and an
electric power company with regard to charges for the supply
of electric energy eontaiDed an escalator clause which provided that such charges would be increased at a designated
rate if the market price of crude oil should exceed a stated
price per barrel, and the contract also contained a provision
that "in the event the [utility] Company shall •.• place in
effect any lower or'more advantageous rates than those at
any time in effect hereunder • • • the Company shall likewise
make the same rate e1fective for the Consumer hereunder," the
purpose of the escalator clause was to protect the utility's
eost differential between the lower contract price and available existing tari1fs, and the utility might not with impunity
employ that clause to raise charges above existing schedules,
and when it did so the cement company was entitled to reeover
reparations for the overcharges.

PROOEEDING to review an order of the Public Utilities
Oommission dismissing complaints for reparations. Order
annulled.
O'Melveny & Myers, Lauren M. Wright, Overton, Lyman,
Plumb, Prince & Vermille and Wayne H. Knight for Petitioners.
Everett C. McKeage, Roderick B. Cassidy, Boris H. Lakasta,
Hal F. Wiggins, J. Tho~ason I Phelps, Harold J. McOarthy,
Henry W. Coil, H. M. Hammack and Donald J. Carman for
Respondents.
SHENK, J.-This is a proceeding to review an order of
the Public Utilities Commission which dismissed three complaints for reparations flIed by Riverside Cement Company
and Southwestern Portland Cement Oompany. Only two of
the cases are involved, and the pertinent facts as to them will
be noted.
[1] See 22 OaL3ur. 63; 43 Am.J'v. 624.
licK. Die. Beferace: [1]l'ublie Utilities, 138.
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In the fall of 1942, at the request of the United States
War Production Board, Riverside Cement Company (referred
- to as Riverside), reopened its plant near Oro Grande. Power
i was furnished by California Electric Power Company (ret-ferred to as the utility) and Riverside commenced negotiations
~ to obtain a rate lower than the:61ed tariff schedules and on a
~- par with rates afforded under existing special contracts. A
approved and authorized by the commission was
e.A.~:\lI.l'LCU by which the utility was to supply electric energy
a five-year term commencing October 14, 1942, at a minicharge of $1.00 per month per horsepower of lO.a:rlmum
t.:ut:1U,,'UU but not less than $4,000 per month, or a total minimum
$240,000 for the five-year period. Paragraph 10(e), desig-as the escalator elause, provided that whenever during
contract the market price of fuel oil should exceed $1.30
barrel, the energy charge should be automatically increased
mXlLe-l:OU:n.n mill per kwh for each full lO-cent increase above
basic oil price. Elsewhere the contract provided for written
of the increase to Riverside which had the option to
j'telreiIld within 90 days, the increased rate to become effective
option was not exercised. Paragraph 14 of the contract
: "That in the event the [utility] Company shall at
- - time, either voluntarily or by order of any legal authority
--- in effect any lower or more advantageous rates than
at any time in effect hereu:nder or to any other cement
I'illW.tlfacttJLriIlg plant or consumer having a load similar to that
C;OlD81ltIIlE!r and in the same territory, the Company shall
RH·.....i .... make the same rate effective for the Consumer here"'UIC~." By agreement the contract was extended to March
--1948.
March 19, 1947, the market price of fuel oil increased
per barrel, and pursuant to notice the service charge
-raised five mills per kwh effective July 1, 1947.- Notice
r,etJlcission of the contract was not given. In the same
D.~ler an additional identical increase became effective on
23, 1947, reflecting the rise in the fuel oil market
to $1.70 per-barrel. Pursuant to a third notice followmg
,
fluctuation in the fuel oil price to $2.15 per barrel,
increase of one cent per kwh might have been
commencing April 12, 1948, except for the expiration
contract on March 31, 1948. After the latter date the
:VeI~Cle service charge was governed by the tarUf schedult!l
with the commission. -
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A similar contract was executed between the utility and
Southwestern Portland Cement Company (herein referrcd to
as Southwestern), except that the contract period was from
May 1, 1944, to April 30, 1949. The same increases were
noticed and charged under the escalator clause, but as in the
case of Riverside after March 31, 1948, service was billed
according to the filed schedules.
Riverside filed a complaint with the commission invoking
the application of paragraph 14 of the contract, alleging overcharges after July 1, 1947, and seeking reparations in the
sum of $21,739.91. Similarly Southwestern sought reparations to the extent of $16,535.72. The commission found that
increases in the fuel oil market price above $1.41 per barrel
would and did from July 1, 1947, result in charged rates
higher than rates computed under the filed schedules or than
rates under contracts of four other consumers alleged to have
similar loads and to be operating in the same territory. During the existence of these contracts none of the filed schedules
or other existing contract rates was revised in any manner
bearing on the issues presented.
The question of which rate was chargeable from July 1,
1947, to March 31, 1948,-the successive increased rates under
the escalator clause or the rate under the filed schedules or
other contracts of similar consumers in the same territorydepended on the effect to be accorded the language of paragraph 14. The commission rejected the contention of the petitioners that it was the parties' expressed intention that if at
any time there was available a schedule or other rate lower
than the contract rate the lower rate was to be made available
to the petitioners. On the contrary the commission adopted the
utility's contention that .by the use of the word "shall" in
paragraph 14 the intention was to make available to the petitioners only such lower or more advantageous rate as sbonld
in the fu~e be placed in effect either by the utilit.1 or the
commission; that is, that since the lower rates from July 1,
1947, were under schedules or contracts which were in effect
at the time of the execution of the petitioners' contracts, they
were not rates which the utility thereafter placed in effeet;
that the oil escalator clause rather than paragraph 14 applied;
that petitioners' remedy was rescission after notice of the
increase; that that remedy was not pursued and the petitioners
were not entitled to reparations.
The petitioners urge that the position of the commission is
contrary to the applicable policy announoecl ia otber cases.
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In City of Vernon v. Southern Calif. Gas Co., Dec. No. 21860,
34 C.R.C. 46 (Dec. 1929), and Batchelder-Wilson Co. v.
Southern Calif. Gas Co., Dec. No. 22806, 35 C.R.C. 132 (Aug.
1930). several complainants were held entitled to reparations
because of the defendant's failure to comply with a rule,
, desigoated as Rule 19, making it the duty of the defendant
~ .where two or more rate schedules were applicable to any class
\'of service to call attention to the different rates at the time
c. ,application was made for the service, and whenever new
i:;schedules should be adopted to call the consumer's attention
::, to the new rates.
.~. A similar Rule 19 applicable to the utility was in effect
:when the consumer selected a rate under tariff schedules in
\existence at the time service was requested, and placing upon
rthe utility the duty to advise those of its customers affected in
event of adoption of new or optional schedules or rates.
rule and the foregoing decisions of the commission india required utility policy of affording to the consumer the
rftY\nt"lrllllniitv to select the lowest rate suited to its needs at the
[,CCIm1nel[lCE!m~mt of service and the consumer's right to be kept
'CiLYlnr'ised of new lower rates when such should become effective.
LvUtly none of the existing schedule rates was deemed
to the needs of these petitioners, who sought a lower
to be based on gnaranteed length of service and specified
payments. The executed contract providing such a
was based on those considerations. Since Rule 19 was
mtapl~l1(~aD.Le to the glpecial case, paragraph 14 was added to
cOIltr,act for the obvious purpose of complying with the
li1teiQUlrea policy, thus preserving to the petitioners the right
.lower or more advantageous rate should such be placed
_ ...... ·~_v during the life of the contract.
As the provisions both of Rule 19 and paragraph 14
D(1lCi&t4~, it was not the purpose to place on the consumer the
seeking and acquiring information as to the probable
available tariff. The utility thereby undertook to perthe office of supplying the information and opportunity
when occasion demanded. The general policy
BIlml1l'f>n the utility to afford to the consumer the lowest or
advantageous rate. Since the purpose of the contract...
to obtain a rate lower than the filed tariffs and on a par
other special rates, it is. unreasonable to assume that the
~~,onlers agreed to pay any rate higher than such exi::;ting
.The contrary intention expressed in paragraph 14 indi-
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cates that if, at any time during the contract, rates lower than
the contract rates should become available.. the petitioners
should have the advantR.ge thereof. It follows that the purpose
of the escalator clause was to protect the utility's cost difYerential between the lower contract rate and available existing
tariffs. And it is likewise unreasonable to nSSlllue that the
utility might with impunity employ that clause to raise
charges above existjng schedules. The utility itself recognized
the appropriate remedy and procedure when the priee of fuel
oil no. longer justified the filed tari1f schedules nnd in 1948
applied to the commission for incrca.C!cs in those tariffs. It was
during the progress of that application that the patitioners
discovered they had been paying charges higher than the
existing tari1fs.
The utility'. attempt to rest upon the future tense of
the verb in paragraph 14 cannot avail it under thefactB.
Obviously the language would apply in the event. tariffs were
reduced below the contract rate. But that is not the exclusive
application. A similar situation in effect obtained here when
the company gave notice increasing the contract charge above
the existing tari1f. That act was the equivalent of placing in
effect a rate or schedule lower or ~ore advantageous than the
contract rate. As the commission found, the price of fuel oil
could go to $1.41 without increasing the contract rate above
the filed tariff. When, however, the utility raised the contract
rate above the filed tariff, to all the intents and purposes of
paragraph 14 it was placing in effect a rate lower or more
advantageous than the in~reased contract rate.
It may not be questioned that if the language of paragraph 14 applied it took precedence over the provisionS of
the escalator clause and afforded a lower rate to the petitioners
from July 1, 1947, overcharges resulted, and the petitioners
were entitled to·recover reparations. That result is determinative here and it becomes unnecessary to disCUSB other matters,
none of which may be deemed to override the controlling intent
and policy. Nor is it proper on this review to consider which
of the lower rates applies, whether that under the filed
tariffs or the contract rate of other consumers in the same
territory. Those are factual issues bearing on the amount of
the reparations and are for the commission to resolve.
From the foregoing it follows that the portions of the com·
mission's order dismissing the two complaints should be
annulled and the cases remanded for computation of the
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[ amount of reparations due to the petitioners respectively.
,
It is so ordered.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J.,
~ncurred.

:.' TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-The annulment of the eom.D:llssion 's order is hased on the premise that the utility placed
effect lower rates to another consumer having a load similar
that of petitioners within the meaning of paragraph 14 of the
tract. The rates allegedly placed in effect are the tariff
that were in effect when the contract was signed. In
when Riverside asked the commission's approval of a
It._I'''''''''''' contract deviating from PW-l and PW-2, the existing
.,,'1':"'''--'-, Riverside stated in a letter to the commission on Octo7, 1942: "With reference to the Power Company's pubschedules PW-l and PW-2, our belief is that neither
these schedules is reasonably adapted to the conditions of
lleIam~mt plant operation. So far as we are advised, no cement
1':~:lmlPaxl:Y has ever operated under either of these schedules."
we are now asked to interpret the contract as having
tu~.~rl:'or,ateld a schedule not "reasonably adapted to the conof cement plant operation."
is contended that the original tariff of rates in effect in
~hen the special contract was signed by the parties and
~n... nv~·l1 by the commission was "placed in effect" on July
when the utility raised the contract price of electricity
the level of the ta~iff prices) by virtue of the fuel oil
r,A.ATIll' clause, paragraph 10(e). The words "shall place
" .would ordinarily lead one to interpret paragraph
applying only to tariffs approved after the signing of
It is urged that paragraph 14 be construed to
Possible increases under the "escalator" clause to the
of rates already in existence because "the plU'pose of
.
clause was to protect the ntility's cost differential
the lower contract rate and available existing tariffs."
I!IJtlmo,ny in the record bearing on the meaning of the fuel oil
clause runs counter to this interpretation, and leads
that the purpose of the clause was to preserve
a margin of profit over its operating costs.1
the two witneB8e8 heard by the Examiner was the ehief rate
. the defendant utility. called 88 • witness by the eomplainant.

DidD't you, in ,eneral. try to establish your ratee
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If this testimony is disregarded and the existing rates are
accepted as a ceiling on the rates under the contract,S paragraph 12 thereof is rendered meaningless. That paragraph
specifically gives the consumer power to terminate the contract after an increase in price under paragraph 10 (e), the
U escalator" provision. The protection afforded the consumer
by this power of termination and the protection afforded the
utility by the escalator clause are both rendered superfluous
if the contract rates no longer apply after the price of fuel oil
rises to $1.41 per barrel, the point at which the price of fuel
oil causes the price of power under the contract to rise to
the level of the tariff prices. rn my opinion the contract per-

)

panifta like the Cement Companica• .nth large "olumes of power or l1IIing
large volumOll would P"1 less pllr Irilow:Ltt bour thau the companiea
using a 8DIaller ,·olume of power?
.. A. Yes, 11.8 long as we h:Ld lIuge volumes of cheap power available~
"Q. And you tried, in general, to keep the relationship between the
Coment Companies and other large ~olume user. versua the smaller 118ers
on that basis as best you could?
•• A. Excopt that where a margin of profit was utreme11 small we
have incorporated hedging clauscs like the fuel oU clause so that we
would not be caught selling power at a los@ when prices went up.
IIQ. Coming back to my question again. the policy wna, apart from
the earnings of the Company, the policy was, as between rates for
coDll11IDers, thttt the larger volume eonsumer would normally have a lower
rate than the smaller volume consumer?
II A. Generally. yea; when you got into very large volumea other
factors entered.
IIQ. Do you have any instance in your Company, or did yon have
in 1947, where you considered large volume users should pay a higher
rate for their electrjcity thu lower volume users?
I I A.
Yea, we did. You have to consider, it you are thinking of the
Southwestern and Rivenrld., Cement, yon have to COllSider the period
of the contract as a whole, and it we were selling on a very thin margin
. .of .profiLthere•. whiehWlts ",iduntly cOJltcm}.lated in the contract, this
eventuality was contemplawd ~ the contract 80 that when our costs
went up this thin margin W9.II presened to a devee."
.
IHad the parties eo intended the provision could have been drafted
simply and direet1,.. In a rel'ent e:uIe before tho commission (B~ Pacific
GtJ8 I' B16ctric Co•• Decildon No. 42234, Application No. 27459). a
utility was pcrmitted to modify ~ speciAl oontract containing an eaealator
clause. The modification conformed to an oral understanding between the
ntility and the consumer-lumber company that: I I In the event, during
the term of said agreement, applicntion of rates and conditions of an
applieable Illed elrct.ric tariff of PRcific to the account of lumber com·
pany would result in lower cost for electric senice than the rates set
lIut in said agreement, lumber company would be aecorded the benefit
thereof." Both parties in that ease agreed that this sentence embodied
the understanding of the p:utica. In tho prespnt case there was no testi·
mony by Cement Company officials concerning the originlll negotiations;
petitioners have sought merely to make p:uagrnph 14 applicable.
For another example of n contract cont!lining a fuol oil esealator
clause subject to etlLted maximum Ilnd minimum ratea, II8e
01
y ..... v. BovIM,. CAUl. G". Co.,. 84 CAC. 46 [l029].
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mits the consumer either to continue the contract in the hope
of a drop in fuel oil prices or to terminate the contract and
accept the potential advantages or disadvantages of the tariil
rates. To order reparations to the petitioners now that the
contract has expired permits the consumer to accept all the
benefits of the contract, with prices set retroactively as though
their power to terminate had been exercised.
f· We turn now to the four special contracts with other con;' sumen that allegedly "placed in .effect" lower rates. Two
f.
of the contracts, those with Sierra Talc Company and Natural
! Soda Products Company, merely extended the rates of Schedule P-2, a schedule of limited applicability. to companies that
had been served on that basis for years. After the commission
authorized the utility to cancel the schedule of limited applicability, the same rates were continued by special contracts.
The contract with West End Chemical Company pro"9ided the
'Same rates as those set forth in the filed schedule No PW,
; discussed above. It cannot be said that lower rates were
L "placed in effect" by these three contracts, since they merely
teontinued rate schedules available to and refused by petition~ ~ at the time their contract was signed. The conclusion that
~' paragraph 14 did not refer to the PW schedules in effect when
j,the contract was signed applies with equal force to contracts
':that pro"9ided rates equiValent to the tariff rates.
• . Finally, petitioners complain that the contract between
the utility and the United States Navy for ....service ··to--tbe ... -_.
.~a'V'al Ordnance ~t~tion at Inyokern "placed in effect" lower
~rates. The CODlDllSSlon apparently agrees: "that contract con~~ed rates which were identical with those in Option B of
~ia~ Schedule No. PW. Since the Navy received service at
t~,ooo volts, a discount of 5% was incorporated in the contract.
The inclusion of this high voltage discount, coupled with the
" visions of Schedule No. PW, in the commission's opinion
.'Dstituted placing in effect a lower and more advantageous
.~~ than Schedule No. PW." The commission concluded,
. :~wever, that even "if the Cement Companies had facilities
~able to take delivery at this voltage, and could have quali.~ . for the high voltage discount, it is not apparent that the
of the special contract with the Navy Department would
"~ produced a lower bill throughout the period of the conthan was actually billed to the Cement Companies."
": failure to grant reparations despite the finding that the
r;·::'.to
." the Navy was lower than the contract rate to Riverside
1<:
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and Southwestern indicates that the Cement Companies failed
to sustain their burden under section 71 of proving to the
commission that they were injured because the utility "deprived them of any rate to which they were entitled." (Batchelder-Wilson 00. v. Southern Oalif. Gas 00., 35 C.RC. 132,
134; Oity of Vernon v. Southern Oalif. Gas 00., 34 C.RC.
46,48.)
We are referred to Rule and Regulation No. 19, the' 'policy"
of which was allegedly violated by the utility in this case. The
applicable portions of the rule provide: "(b) Where there
are two or more rate schedules applicable to any class of
service, the Company or its authorized employees will ~all
applicant's attention, at the time application is made, to the
several schedules, and the customer must designate which
rate or schedule he desires. (c) In the event of the adoption
by the Company of new or optional schedules or rates, the
Company will take such mp.asures as may be practicable to
advise those of its customers who may be affected that such
new or optional rates are effective." It is conceded that Rule
19 applies only to consumers given service under tariff schedules and not to consUmers with special contracts. This fact
alone distinguishes the cases relied upon by petitioners, since
all the consumers granted reparations in those cases were
operating under rate tariffs. (Batchelder-Wilson 00. v. Southern Oalif. Gas 00., 35 C.RC. 132; Oity of Vernon v. Southern
Oalif. Gas 00., 34 C.R.C. 46.) Furthermore, Rule 19 applies
by its terms only where two or more rate schedules are available at the time application for service is made, or "in the
event of the adoption by the [utility] of new or optional
schedules or rates." In the latter case, the utility is bound
only to take such measures to advise consumers CCas may be
practicable. "
Even if it is assumed that paragraph 14 gives the consumer
the protection of Rule 19, it does not follow that the utility
undertook "to perform the office of supplying the information
and opportunity of selection [of more advantageous rates]
when occasion demanded." Under the commission's view, this
would be a promise to perform the impossible. "Since any
such determination depends upon the future operations of this
customer, the final decision with respect to whether or not
any other rates are lower or more advantageous is the ultilWlte responsibility of the customer. Neither the utility nor
this Commission can anticipate future customer usage which is
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entirely within the discretion of the customer as to its future
volume.'"
Rule 19 requires notification, as may be practicable, about;
newly promulgated tariff schedules or novel special contracts.
Neither the letter nor the spirit of Rule 19 requires utilities
to prognosticate the future nature and extent of the consumer's use of power and then advise the consumer if there
is a possible advantage under preexisting tariff rates. It is
sensible to require notice to consumers of newly-adopted schedules or contracts, because the consumer probably would not
. have knowledge of them. It is a different matter when the •
utility is placed under a duty to give notice of tariffs that had
, been in effect at least five years and from which the consumer
. had specifically asked to be excepted.
.' Since the rise in' power prices under the "escalator" clause
'aid not "place in effect" lower rates within the meaning of
, paragraph 14, and since Rule 19 does not apply to this case,
the order should be affirmed.
Edmonds, J'J concurred.
, Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied June 1,
i950. Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., voted for a rehearing.
l~""""""--------------------""-----------------------------------------------------------~~;"The rate schedule of the contract indicates that the montliq charg•
. for electricity fluctuates with the intensity and volume of cnstomer
, _ e . Paragraph 10 provides:
~,*H Emmay CHAlWlrr-First 200 lQlowatt-houra per month per
.
'j
horsepower of maximum demand.... . .. . . . .. 1.04 cents per kwJa
,
All over 200 kilowatt-honrs
, . per month per horsepower of
\ maximum demand ,. "
. ." .. , .. ".... .416"
»
»
,::~. Kmuroll CHAlWm--$I.00 per month per horsepower of
~. ~ Maximum Demand, but not less than $4,000.00 per month.
~'SPEC1AL CoNDITlONs-(a) The maximum demand in any montll
t . .'
be the average horsepower input, (746 watts equivalent), indicated
t~ recorded by instruments to be furnished and installed b,. the Comftpy upon Consumer's premWes adjacent to or integral with watt-hour
;:ip.eter or meters, in the I5-minute interval in which the consumption ot
[~eri1 is greater than in all)' other 15-minute interval in such month,
:OJ', at the option of the Company the maximum demand may be deterfmined by test.
f&.:,'(b) The maximum demand for monthl,. billing Purposes for an,.
••ven month shall be the horsepower of measured maxunum demand'
~oeeurring during such month but in no case less than 75% of the .
. " • um demand occurring during the eleven next preceding month..
(e) In ease notice of contemplated curtailment of operations on
e' part of Consumer is given to the Compan,. and such curtailed opera. ,*ur over a period of at least six consecutive calendar months, the
':ri8i'ons of paragraph (b) hereinbefore shall not appl;:r•••• "
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